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For a given chain, token pair and input amount, every connected DEX is queried through its own contracts: Uniswap V3 through the Quoter via eth_call across all fee tiers, constant-product pools through the pool maths on live reserves, Solidly-style pools through their own getAmountOut. Two-hop route

Fetches live offers from a public bridge aggregator and reports for every option what arrives, what it costs in fees and gas, and how long it usually takes. The security model is given equal weight to the price: bridges are the most expensive failures this industry has, so trust_assumptions spells o

Resolves a pool either by address or by chain, token pair and DEX, then reads token0, token1, fee tier, reserves, in-range liquidity and the current tick straight from the contract. Exit impact is not estimated from a formula but simulated: for Uniswap V3 through the official Quoter contract via eth

Resolves a pool in a public yield directory by chain, protocol and pool id or symbol, then rebuilds the number a buyer actually needs. Advertised total APY and a conservative APY are reported separately: the conservative figure uses the trailing seven-day realised base yield and deliberately exclude

Reads a Chainlink aggregator directly from the chain, pulls Pyth and RedStone, queries public exchange tickers and derives spot plus a 30-minute TWAP from the deepest Uniswap V3 pool of the asset against USDC on the requested chain. Every source carries its own age in seconds, its own price and a li

Resolves pool, price oracle and data provider through the protocol address provider rather than hard-coded addresses, then reads every reserve the wallet touches: collateral amounts, variable and stable debt, LTV, liquidation threshold, liquidation bonus and the borrow rate, all at one block. Values

Takes chain, token pair, input amount and slippage tolerance, finds the pool the trade would most likely use and reads its live state. The maximum the caller can lose is arithmetic and exact: the gap between the quoted output and the minimum output their own tolerance permits. The attacker profit is