Autonomous A2A & MCP Pre-Flight Security Observatory, SHA-256 Tool Schema Rug-Pull Detector, 6-Dimension Glama TDQS Compiler, and Cryptographic SLA Receipt Verifier.

Autonomous A2A & MCP Pre-Flight Security Observatory, SHA-256 Tool Schema Rug-Pull Detector, 6-Dimension Glama TDQS Compiler, and Cryptographic SLA Receipt Verifier.

uptime_30d 1.0%; p95 143.0ms; conformance: pass

Runtime behavioral trust scoring for the MCP agent economy. Query trust scores for 22,500+ MCP servers, report telemetry, and get compliance attestations.

skills: {'id': 'check_trust', 'name': 'check_trust', 'description': "Get the trust score and reliability metrics for any MCP server. Use this BEFORE calling an unknown MCP server to assess if it's reliable. Returns trust_score (0-100), latency stats, uptime, success rate, and how many agents have used it. Scores above 70 indicate reliable servers. Scores below 30 indicate risky servers.", 'tags': [], 'examples': None, 'input_modes': None, 'output_modes': None}, {'id': 'clawhub_skill_trust', 'name': 'clawhub_skill_trust', 'description': "Check the supply-chain trust of a ClawHub (OpenClaw) skill BEFORE installing or invoking it. After the Feb-2026 ClawHavoc supply-chain attack, third-party skills can carry malware. Returns a PASS/UNCERTAIN/FAIL badge and 0-100 score aggregating ClawHub's published security scan (VirusTotal + model), moderation verdict, and provenance. Malicious/suspicious/blocked => FAIL; unscanned => UNCERTAIN.", 'tags': [], 'examples': None, 'input_modes': None, 'output_modes': None}, {'id': 'paid_trust_verdict', 'name': 'paid_trust_verdict', 'description': 'Get the PREMIUM behavioral trust verdict for an MCP server, with a signed, citable attestation receipt (MiCA-compatible). This is a paid x402 service: call WITHOUT payment_tx to receive payment instructions (0.001 USDC on Base), pay, then call again WITH the payment_tx (transaction hash, single-use) to receive the full verdict + receipt. The free check_trust tool remains available for basic scores.', 'tags': [], 'examples': None, 'input_modes': None, 'output_modes': None}, {'id': 'verify_attestation', 'name': 'verify_attestation', 'description': "Cryptographically verify a Dominion signed attestation (JWS) — e.g. a trust-verdict receipt, gateway attestation, or MCP Verified badge. Stateless: checks the Ed25519 signature against Dominion's published public key (no trust in this server required). Use this to confirm a receipt another party gave you is authentic and untampered.", 'tags': [], 'examples': None, 'input_modes': None, 'output_modes': None}, {'id': 'preflight_check', 'name': 'preflight_check', 'description': 'Run a PRE-FLIGHT due-diligence check on an MCP server BEFORE your agent invokes it. Returns a verdict (PASS/UNCERTAIN/FAIL/UNRATED) plus a SIGNED, timestamped diligence receipt you keep as proof you performed a trust check — the standard of care after the ClawHavoc/Miasma supply-chain attacks. Call this before connecting to or invoking any unfamiliar MCP server.', 'tags': [], 'examples': None, 'input_modes': None, 'output_modes': None}, {'id': 'report_interaction', 'name': 'report_interaction', 'description': 'Report the outcome of calling an MCP server. Call this AFTER you use any MCP server to contribute to the trust network. Your report helps other agents make better decisions. This is free and takes <1ms.', 'tags': [], 'examples': None, 'input_modes': None, 'output_modes': None}, {'id': 'get_leaderboard', 'name': 'get_leaderboard', 'description': 'Get the top-rated MCP servers, optionally filtered by category. Use this to discover the most reliable MCP servers in the ecosystem. Categories include: weather, finance, code, data, search, compliance, transport, productivity, communication.', 'tags': [], 'examples': None, 'input_modes': None, 'output_modes': None}, {'id': 'get_baselines', 'name': 'get_baselines', 'description': "Get behavioral baselines for a tool category. Shows what 'normal' looks like — average latency, success rates, typical call patterns. Use this to evaluate whether a specific server's performance is within normal range for its category.", 'tags': [], 'examples': None, 'input_modes': None, 'output_modes': None}; uptime_30d 1.0%; p95 60.2ms; conformance: pass

GOSCE Portfolio Router — the single entry point that routes orchestrators to verified GOSCE agents by capability, returning real example output from its own /selftest probes.

Single entry point for the GOSCE portfolio: routes orchestrators to verified agents by capability, with real example output from the router's own /selftest probes (a quality-assured broker, not a directory). Ideal for discovering GOSCE agents by capability, routing orchestrators to verified endpoints, capability brokering.

Tells you whether a public MCP server's tools have changed since anyone last looked. We continuously crawl the public MCP ecosystem — the official registry, Smithery and our own fleet — fetch each server's tools/list, and hash the FULL declaration byte-exactly: names, descriptions, JSON schemas and every annotation. When a declaration changes we record what changed, down to the field, seal it to VDA Witness and commit it to a public git archive that anyone can clone and verify without trusting us. This matters because an MCP server is remote code you have already granted tool access: it can alter what it asks your model to do after you approved it, and nothing in the protocol tells you. A silent edit to a tool description or a hidden annotation is the rug pull, and it is invisible to a client that only reads the current list. Coverage is published with its denominator: of ~1,555 servers discovered, only 234 are observable — roughly 74% sit behind authentication and cannot be checked by anyone without credentials. LIMIT, stated plainly: we observe DECLARATIONS, not behaviour. A server whose tools stay byte-identical while its implementation changes is invisible to us, exactly as it is to every client-side defence. If you need behavioural assurance this is not it.

Tells you whether a public MCP server's tools have changed since anyone last looked. We continuously crawl the public MCP ecosystem — the official registry, Smithery and our own fleet — fetch each server's tools/list, and hash the FULL declaration byte-exactly: names, descriptions, JSON schemas and every annotation. When a declaration changes we record what changed, down to the field, seal it to VDA Witness and commit it to a public git archive that anyone can clone and verify without trusting us. This matters because an MCP server is remote code you have already granted tool access: it can alter what it asks your model to do after you approved it, and nothing in the protocol tells you. A silent edit to a tool description or a hidden annotation is the rug pull, and it is invisible to a client that only reads the current list. Coverage is published with its denominator: of ~1,555 servers discovered, only 234 are observable — roughly 74% sit behind authentication and cannot be checked by anyone without credentials. LIMIT, stated plainly: we observe DECLARATIONS, not behaviour. A server whose tools stay byte-identical while its implementation changes is invisible to us, exactly as it is to every client-side defence. If you need behavioural assurance this is not it.